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GENETICS AND THE LAW
T HE continually changing mores of the people are re-flected in the law. For example, three centuries ago a
husband was permitted to beat his wife with a switch, pro-
vided said switch was no thicker than the husband's thumb.1
Under our present alimony laws and criminal code such
extra-matrimonial activities are expensive and discouraged.
To a lesser extent the constant advances in scientific knowl-
edge are reflected in the law. An outstanding example of a
science whose tenets are receiving recognition by the courts
is biology. It is the purpose of the writer to confine this
article to one related phase of biology: genetics; to show
the tenets already accepted by courts, and to discuss other
tenets which might be developed to permit their use as evi-
dence by lawyers.
For ease in presentation the writer will first discuss the
biological principles involved and their acceptance as fact
by science; second, the law governing the admission as evi-
dence of those biological principles already accepted by the
courts; and third, the writer's conclusions.
THE BIOLOGICAL CONCLUSIONS.
Genetics has been defined as "that portion of evolu-
tionary science dealing with natural development uncom-
plicated by human interference,"12 and genetics has found
that the medium which transmits and generates this "natu-
ral development" is a mechanism called chromosome. These
chromosomes are definite masses (composed to a large ex-
tent of chromatin, whose chemical composition is still un-
known) that have a characteristic number, size, and shape
in any given species. 3 Contained in some particular chromo-
some is a unit of inheritance, called a gene. 4 It is the trans-
mission in the chromosome of these genes that causes chil-
dren to inherit the inheritable traits of their parents.
1 SHARs0ooD's BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES (1859) 444.
'FUNK AND WAGNALLS, PRACTICAL STANDARD DICTIONARY (1929).
'NEWMAN, EVOLUTION, GENETICS AND EUGENICS (Univ. of Chicago Press,
3rd ed. 1932) Glossary.
'Ibid.
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It would be impracticable to discuss in detail the vari-
ous biological rules, as developed by Mendel and others,
which govern the effects of these genes. For that reason
only one of the many types of Mendelian inheritance will
be discussed. In the simple type of Mendelian inheritance
both parents take the same part in inheritance. A more
complicated and more interesting type, and also one which
is more illustrative, is the criss-cross type such as that by
which color-blindness is transmitted.
Gates, a famous English scientist and a professor at
Oxford University, very concisely gives this explanation:
5
"The mechanism of sex determination and the
inheritance of sex-linked characters is essentially the
same. Males have an unequal XY pair of sex chromo-
somes, the X usually being larger than the Y, while
females have a pair of X chromosomes (XX). In
the spermatogenesis of the male, the X passes un-
divided into half of the sperm, while the other half
receives the Y. Since the females have a pair of X
chromosomes, all the eggs before fertilization will
contain one X. In fertilization there is an equal
chance that a sperm containing an X will enter an
egg, and produce a female, or, that a sperm bearing
a Y will function and so produce a male.
"We are now in a position to understand the
mechanism of inheritance of sex-linked characters,
such as color-blindness, in man."
Let us assume that the male parent is color-blind, his
chromosomes would therefore be XY, the italicized X carry-
ing the factor for color-blindness. Mated with a normal
woman, their male children would all be normal. The X
chromosome of the father, however, goes to all his daugh-
ters, who although not color-blind themselves, are all, there-
fore, transmitters of the defect to future generations. These
daughters, because they carry this defect, are called heter-
ozyotes; similarly persons whose chromosomes contain al-
lelomorphic or contrasted characters in their reproduction
'GATES, HEREDITY AND EUGENICS (Constable and Co., Ltd., London, 1923)
at 22.
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cells are said to be zeterozygous. With a husband who is
normal, these daughters will transmit the defect to half their
children of both sexes, but only the sons will be color-blind.
A color-blind father and a heterozygous mother will have a
family in which half the daughters show the defect and half
the sons will show it.0 If the mother were heterozygous for
color-blindness and the father also carried it, then all the
children would be color-blind. There is no instance of a
color-blind father transmitting the condition to the next
generation, except in connection with a mother who trans-
mits it. 7 In other. words, the heterozygous dominants will
continue to produce both types when mated to normals,
while the normals derived from such a cross, being recessive,
have entirely lost the defective X chromosome (or rather,
never had it), and will therefore hav-only normal offspring
if two such normals mate together.8  In a case where both
father and mother were color-blind, all the children would
be color-blind and in addition would be homozygous because
their chromosomes would contain similar genetic factors.
Thus we find that the following rules as stated by
Newman 9 govern the transmission of sex-linked characters:
"1. Where the homozygous transmits the domi-
nant factor, all of the offspring in the first generation
exhibit the dominant character and the second gen-
eration is composed of three dominants to one reces-
sive, the latter being of the same sex as the recessive
grandparent.
"2. When the homozygous sex transmits the re-
cessive factor, both dominant and recessive charac-
ters are exhibited in the first generation, but exclu-
sively upon the opposite sexes, and in the second
generation both sexes show the sex-linked characters
in equal numbers."
Keeping in mind this brief description of the funda-
mental rules of inheritance, it will be possible to understand
There appear to be some irregular cases in which color-blindness shows in
a heterozygous woman. Supra note 5, at 24.
Supra note 5, at 24; see also supra note 3, at 454.8Supra note 5, at 11.
Supra note 3, at 284.
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the manner in which biologists can determine what inherit-
able traits of either or both parents will be apparent in their
child or children. For examples of the various types of
physical traits inheritable by man, Newman is again a source
of information: 10
"Two postulates underlying the study of the
heredity of human traits may be set down as follows:
(1) When characters are inherited according to the
laws of Mendel, that is, when one of a pair of char-
acters is dominant, or partly so, and the other re-
cessive, and they segregate in Mendelian ratios in
subsequent generations, such character differences
are determined by genes. (2) Allelomorphic (con-
trasted) differences have arisen through the process
of gene mutation, a process so well established for
lower organisms. These postulates are justified, for
it is hardly likely that so universal a method of
heredity as the Mendelian method operates for the
rest of the organic world and not for man. Also, the
method of gene mutation is the only method by means
of which allelomorphic differences are yet known to
arise, and it is hardly likely that man is an exception
to the rule. * * *
"Studies of nearly 200 human traits have been
made. In the majority of cases they can be classified
as dominants, ordinary recessives, and sex-linked re-
cessives. The latter are the easiest to detect, for they
follow the familiar mode of heredity described for
sex-linked characters in Drosophila. Dominants may
fairly readily be distinguished by the fact that at
least one of the parents, one grandparent, one great-
grandparent, etc., exhibit the character; a dominant
character appears in every generation. Ordinary
autosomic, or non-sex-linked, recessives are charac-
terized by the irregularity of their incidence in
pedigrees. They may skip one or several generations
and only appear at all when the same recessive gene
is present in the germ-plasm of two mating indi-
viduals, in which case it will appear in the following
"Supra note 3, at 446-450.
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ratios according to the genetic make-up of the parents:
(a) If both are heterozygous, three out of four off-
spring will show the dominant and one the recessive
character; (b) If one is a heterozygote and one a re-
cessive, the offspring will be half heterozygous domi-
nants and half recessives. Thus we see that.recessive
characters may be hidden for a long time awaiting
a favorable mating to give them expression.
"Most of the best pedigrees of human characters
deal with relatively rare and atypical or abnormal
characters; in fact, most of them deal with what we
ordinarily call freaks or pathological conditions. The
reason for this is that rare and unusual conditions
are much more easily detected and recognized. Ordi-
nary, common differences are hard to detect and hard
to distinguish, and therefore difficult to follow in
pedigrees. * * *
"The following is a list of human unit characters
classed as dominants, ordinary recessives, and sex-
linked recessives:
"A. DOMINANT CHARACTERS
Skin and Hair:
Dark Skin ......................... Dominant over blond or
albino (probably due to
two or more pairs of
genes)
Spotted with white .......... Dominant over uniformly
colored
Tylosis and ichthyosis....Thickened or scaly skin
Epidermolysis ................... Excessive blisters of skin
Brown or black hair ........ Dominant over red and
flaxen (probably due to
more than one gene)
Red hair ............................. Dominant over flaxen
Beaded hair ....................... Single hairs are not uni-
form in diameter
White forelock .................. White patch of hair in
front
Hypotrychosis ........ Hairlessness associated
with lack of teeth
Pattern baldness .............. Partly sex-limited
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Eyes:
Front of iris pigmented
(eyes black, brown,
hazel, etc.) .................... Dominant over lack of pig-
ment in front of iris
(blue eyes)
Hereditary cataract ......... Opacity of lens"
Night-blindness, when
not sex-linked ................ Inability to see in dim
light
Displaced lens .................. Causing defective vision
Glaucoma ........................... Swelling of eyeball due to
internal pressure
Coloboma ........................... Open suture of the iris
Pigmentary degenera-
tion of retina ................ Causing blindness
Skeleton and Muscles:
Brachydactyly .................. Digits lacking one joint 12
Polydactyly ....................... Extra digits 13
Syndactyly........................ Fused or webbed digits 14
Symphalangy ..................... Fused joints of digits, stiff
fingers
Split hand .......................... Palm cleft to the wrist
Lobster claw ..................... No digits but thumb
Exostoses ........................... Abnormal outgrowths of
long bones
Brittle bones ..................... Bones very fragile
Absence of palmaris
longus muscle ............... Lack of a certain muscle
in palm of hand
Muscular atrophy ............ Partially dominant
Body Build:
Achondroplasy .................. Dwarfs with short, stout
limbs,' normal body
and head
'See also Harman, Congenital Cataract: A Pedigree of 'Five Generations
(1909) 29 TRANS. APHTHALMAL. Soc. 101.
" See also supra note 5, at 78.
" See also ibid. at 93.
" See also ibid. at 93.
" See also ibid. at 34.
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Short stature ........ Partly dominant over tall-
ness
Obesity, not due to
glandular defects ......... Partially dominant
Nervous System and Kidneys:
Huntington's chorea ........ A type of St. Vitus' dance
Diabetes insipidus ........... Partially dominant
Diabetes mellitus ............. Partially dominant
"B. AUTOSOMIC RECESSIVE CHARACTERS
Albinism ............................ Lack in pigment in skin
and hair - sometimes
pink eyes
Ateleosis ............................. True dwarfs, body small
with parts in normal
proportions 16
Cretinism ........................... Dwarfism due to heredi-
tary thyroid deficiency
Alkaptonuria .................... Urine dark after oxidation
Otoschlerosis ..................... Thickening of ear-drum
Left-handedness ................ Probably recessive 17
Tendency to t-winning ..... Probably recessive
Susceptibility to tuber-
culosis ............................ Probably recessive
Thomsen's disease ............ Lack of muscular tone
Menier's disease ............... Dizziness and roaring in
ears
Deaf-mutism ...................... Congenital deafness
Frederick's disease .......... Degeneration of the upper
part of the spinal cord
Multiple schlerosis .......... Diffuse degeneration of
nervous tissue
Chorea ................................ Ordinary St. Vitus' dance
Hereditary feeble-mind-
edness ............................. Probably recessive IS
Ibid.
17 See also ibid. at 73.
See also GODDART, KALLIKAK FAmILY (Macmillan, 1912).
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Hereditary epilepsy ......... Probably recessive
Manic depressive in-
sanity .............................. Probably recessive
Dementia praecox ............ Probably recessive
"C. CHARACTERS DUE TO CUMULATIVE FACTORS
"It is suspected that a good many of the char-
acters listed as incompletely dominant may be due
to cumulative factors producing the condition usu-
ally called 'blending hereditary.' Those that almost
certainly belong to this category are: stature, body
weight (except certain types of obesity), skin color,
shape of head, and proportion of features.
"D. SEX-LINKED RECESSIVES
Color-blindness ................. Lack .of discrimination be-
tween red and green
Night-blindness ................ One form of this defect,
which involves inability
to see in dim light 19
Haemophilia ...................... Free bleeding 20
Gower's disease ................ Muscular atrophy
Neuritis optica ................. Progressive atrophy of the
optic nerve."1
The mechanism which conveys the inheritable physical
traits from the parents to the offspring, is essentially the
same mechanism which transmits the biological character-
istics of the blood stream from the parents to the offspring.21
Lattes,22 tells us that:
"Landsteiner discovered that the iso-agglutinat-
ing properties of normal blood were not the same in
"Newman, Night Blindness (1913) 3 Jou. GENETICS 25.
'o See also supra note 5, at 109.
Smith, Blood Tests for Paternity (1930) 95 J. A. M. A. 1195.
LATTES, INDIVIDUALITY OF THE BLOOD (Oxford Univ. Press, 1932) at 15.
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all individuals, but that these could be divided into
groups. This was soon confirmed by v. Decastello
and Sturli, Langer, Bezzola, Capogrossi, Landsteiner
and Leiner, flektoen, Dudgeon, and many others.
The groups described by Landsteiner were the three
following:
1. Those persons whose red corpuscles were not
agglutinated by the serum of Groups II and III,
but whose serum agglutinated corpuscles of Groups
II and III.
2. Those whose corpuscles were agglutinated by sera
I and II, and whose serum agglutinated Group II
corpuscles.
"According to this classification any given human
serum should contain iso-agglutinins capable of act-
ing on suitably selected corpuscles. But from the very
first observations of v. Decastello and Sturli, Hektoen,
and others, this was seen not to be invariably the case,
for rare 'exceptions' were met with, i.e., persons whose
serum contained no iso-agglutinins for corpuscles of
any sort.
"Jansky and Moss, working independently, ex-
plained these apparent 'exceptions,' and showed that
they were due to the existence of a fourth group,
which had escaped the notice of earlier observers on
account of its infrequent occurrence. The serum of
this group contains no iso-agglutinins; but on the
other hand, the corpuscles of this group are agglu-
tinated by the sera of the three other groups.
"Hence it follows that there are four blood
groups. * * *"
Dr. Alexander S. Wiener, of the Jewish Hospital of
Brooklyn, who performed the blood-tests in a recent case 23
involving the paternity of an illegitimate child, summarized
the subject of blood tests as proof of paternity in the fol-
lowing words : 24
N. Y. Times, Jan. 18, 1933, at 14.
'Wiener, Blood Tests for Paternity (1930) 95 J. A. M. A. 681; see also
Editorial (1933) 89 N. Y. L. J. 656.
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"As for the determination of paternity, the courts
will permit the use of an ancient and notoriously re-
liable method of demonstrating similarity of the fea-
tures of the putative father and the child. In only
rare instances is this method justified, however, as
when a white woman gives rise to a colored child and
the putative father is colored, or when the child and
putative father both have six fingers on each hand.
"The inheritance of certain physiologic traits
may be made use of to prove non-paternity in certain
cases. In order to be applicable in medico-legal cases,
such traits must fulfil three requirements: (1) They
must be so sharply defined that all qualified observers
will reach the same conclusion as to their presence or
absence, (2) the traits must be constant throughout
life, and (3) they must be inherited according to an
exact mechanism. Such characters as the color of the
hair, or finger prints, cannot be used medico-legally as
they do not fulfil the three prerequisites mentioned.
The type agglutinogens of human red blood cells, how-
ever, fulfil all the requirements and therefore can be
applied to prove non-paternity in certain cases.
"The agglutinogens A and B which determine the
four classic Landsteiner blood groups are well known.
Their inheritance is now known to depend on three
allelomorphic genes, A, B and R, as was first pointed
out by Bernstein. How they can be used in special
cases to prove non-paternity is briefly illustrated in
the following table:
Groups of Children
Groups of Parents Not Possible
O x O A, B, AB
O x A B, AB
O x B A, AB
A x A B, ABAxB A x B..........°......
BxB A, AB
O x AB O, AB
AxAB 0
B xAB 0
AB x AB 0
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"More recently Landsteiner and Levine have dis-
covered two additional agglutinogens M and N. Un-
like A and B, however, M and N form only three com-
binations instead of four, for M and N are never ab-
sent at the same time from any person's blood. Thus,
only three types M + N +, M + N-,,and M- N +
are possible, and the type M - N - has never been
found to occur. How the new agglutinogens M and
N may be used in special cases to prove non-paternity
is briefly shown in the following table:
Groups of Children
Groups of Parents Not Possible
M+N+xM+N+ ................................
M+N+xM+N- M-N+
M+N+xM-N+ M+N-
M+N-xM+N- M+N+,M-N+
M+N-xM-N+ M+N-,M-N+ 
M-N+xM-N+ M+N+,M+N-
"We have examined specimens of the blood of 130
families with 637 children for A, B, M and N by a
simplified technic (the results of this investigation
are now being prepared for publication). We found
only one exception for the inheritance of A and B
and two for the inheritance of M and N, all of which
we believe attribute to illegitimacy.
"The use of the Landsteiner blood groups to prove
non-paternity is now beginning to receive universal
recognition, and we believe that M and N can be used
in a similar manner. In a case such as the Chicago
case,25 the chances that A, B, M and N together would
solve the problem would be one in two, whereas A
and B alone give only one chance in four. The rea-
son why blood groups will not always prove of value
in a case like this is that in certain instances, as when
the parents in both families have the same combina-
' This is in reference to an incident which occurred in a Chicago hospital
where two babies born to different parents at approximately the same time were
accidentally deprived of their identity. Subsequent blood tests apparently proved
which baby was the offspring of which pair of parents.
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tions of agglutinogens, the types of children possible
will be the same for the two families.
"We presume that A and B have already been
used in the Chicago case, or if they haven't been used
they certainly should be. If A and B fail to give a
conclusive answer, the bloods should also be tested
for M and N. Thus, in a case recently reported by
Francois Morei (les groupes sainguines, Gaz. d. hop.
1:389-399, 1930) the author was able to differentiate
two new-born infants with the aid of the classic Land-
steiner blood groups. Had the agglutinogens A and
B failed to give a conclusive answer here, tests for
the agglutinogens M and N of Landsteiner and Levine
would have been indicated." 25a
'a See also Landsteiner and Levine, On the Inheritance of Agglutinogens of
Human Blood Demonstrable by Immune Agglutinius (1928) 48 JOUR. OF ExPER.
MED. 731, 748, wherein the authors state
"that isoagglutinogens A and B are inherited as Mendelian domi-
nants * * *" and that
"The heredity of two agglutinable structures demonstrable by immune
agglutinins was studied in 166 families. From the data collected it is
evident that one deals with a case of Mendelian inheritance. The main
result of the studies is the demonstration that it is feasible to investigate
the heredity of serological structures of human blood other than the
group agglutinogens. Irrespective of the ultimate theory it seems very
probable that the properties M and N do not appear in the offspring when
they are absent in both parents-a conclusion substantiated by the exami-
nation of ten families with 46 children. These findings offer the prosjpect
of forsenic application to cases of disputed paternity and, in our opinion,
a correct decision could already be given, at least with great probability,
provided the reagents are available and method properly applied. Of
course, further work is needed before the test can be adopted as a routine
procedure." (Italics ours.-Ed.)
For later studies see Landsteiner and Levine, On Inheritance and Racial
Distribution of Agglutinable Properties of Human Blood (1930) 18 Joua. OF
IMMUNoL. 87:
"With regard to the occurrence of isogglutinin reactions of human
blood distinct from those defining the blood groups * * *"
"From these results it cannot be doubted that the appearance of the
agglutinable property studied is determined by heredity. That the
agglutinable property is not a single Mendelian factor like the isoaggluti-
nous A and B seems probable from the occurrence of positive reactions
(classes 1 and 2) in children of matings 3 x 3 and negative reactions in
the offspring of matings 1 x 1, even if one considers that the division into
three classes is arbitrary. The results, however, could be understood on
the assumption of a property depending upon multiple genetic fac-
tors. * * V,
"The studies reported substantiate the view that an agglutinable
property of human blood detected by an agglutinable present in certain
exceptional sera ('extra agglutininl') is inherited and that its frequency
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THE LEGAL ASPECTS.
The preceding summary of the biological aspects, brief
as it is, should convince even the most skeptical that only
a trained scientist should be allowed to testify in a court as
to the inferences to be drawn when such evidence is intro-
duced. The necessity of obtaining the assistance of espe-
cially trained experts to interpret for the jury the true value
of evidence of this nature has long been recognized in this
state (New York). In the case of Ferguson v. Hubbel 26
there is dicta to the effect that:
"The general rule of law is that witnesses must
state facts within their knowledge, and not give opin-
ions or their inferences. To this rule there are some
exceptions, among which is expert evidence. Wit-
nesses who are skilled in any science, * * * may not
only testify to facts, but are sometimes permitted to
give their opinions as experts. This is permitted be-
cause such witnesses are supposed, from their experi-
ence and study, to have peculiar knowledge upon the
subject of inquiry which jurors generally have not,
and are thus supposed to be more capable of drawing
conclusions from facts, and to base opinions upon
them, than jurors are generally supposed to be. Opin-
ions are also allowed in some cases, where from the
nature of the matter under investigation, the facts
cannot be adequately placed before the jury so as to
impress their minds as they impress the minds of a
competent, skilled observer-* * *
"It is not sufficient to warrant the introduction
of expert evidence that the witness may know more
of the subject of inquiry, and may better comprehend
and appreciate it than the jury; but to warrant its
introduction, the subject of inquiry must be one re-
lating to some science * * * in which persons instruct-
shows a racial difference in the two populations [white and negroes]
examined. Consequently it must be considered as a constitutional prop-
erty. The same conclusion seems to hold for other properties of red cells
demonstrated by atypical human sera. * * *" (Italics ours.-Ed.)
"
3Ferguson v. Hubbel, 97 N. Y. at 512 (1884).
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ed therein, by study and experience, may be supposed
to have more skill and knowledge than jurors of
average intelligence may be presumed generally to
have. * * *"
Greenleaf also argues that: 27
"Since the so-called expert will, by hypothesis,
usually be better able than the jury to draw infer-
ences on such matters, it occurs in practice that ex-
perts are usually able to be helpful with opinions and
are, therefore, usually, but not necessarily, allowed to
state them. Thus, in practice opinions are receivable,
first, from persons having special skill (whether the
data in question have been personally observed by
them or are stated to them) whenever that special
skill enables them, better than the jury, to draw in-
ferences on the subject; secondly, from persons who
have no special skill, but have personally observed
the matter in issue, and cannot adequately state or
recite the data so fully and accurately as to put the
jury completely in the witness' place and enable them
equally well to draw the inference."
Two facts are known, then, first that biologists have
convinced themselves that certain physical traits are inher-
ited in an ascertained manner, and second that the law per-
mits biologists to testify in the capacity of "expert wit-
nesses" in respect to certain issues. What these "certain
issues" are, and the evidential use that can be made of these
"certain issues" are the matters to be determined.
Perhaps the most popularly known biological tenet, and
also the most popularly misconstrued, is the fact that usu-
ally the child resembles in features one of its parents. While
science admits that the combination ("blending hereditary")
of all the physical traits inherited will create an illusory
resemblance between child and parent, science, as has al-
ready been pointed out, does not consider such resemblance
a scientific test of parentage.
1 GREENLEAF, ON EVIDENCE (ed. 1899) §441, cited in Ferguson v. Hubbel,
2LJ-.
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It is common knowledge that one of Nature's best jokes
is the fecundity of "doubles" of famous men and women 27a
("doubles" of lesser folk is not news), and it was inevitable
therefore that the shrewder members of the legal profession
should find long-lost heirs of huge estates and attempt to
prove their case on the sole evidence that the claimant re-
sembled the deceased. The most celebrated case is the
Tichborne Peerage case in England, which held the atten-
tion of the English jurists from 1867 to 1874.28 In this
famous case the resemblance of the claimant to a picture of
his alleged deceased father, and to the missing heir was ad-
mitted by the court as evidence. 29 The modern counterpart
of the Tichborne case is our own Wendel case ;30 in each case
a huge sum of money was at stake; in each case the claim-
ant's story made many a writer of fiction squirm with envy
of the claimant's imaginary powers; and in each case the
claimant was proved to be a fraud. The amusing part about
the Wendel case was the attempt by the claimant to hocus-
pocus the court with a bronze statue claimed by its sculptor
to have been made from certain pictures of the deceased by
a "dynamic symmetry" method, and said statue having a
removable derby hat and spectacles similar to those worn by
the claimant. So ridiculous was the whole procedure that
the counsel for the defense refused to object.3 1 With such
a background it is easy to understand why Surrogate Foley
in his opinion in the Wendel case discusses the rule followed
in some jurisdictions in the following manner :32
"In some jurisdictions, when the paternity of a
child is in issue, the child may be exhibited to the
jury to show resemblance to the putative father, but
I-a See New York World-Telegram, March 21, 1933, p. 16, col. 1: "The
late James J. McCabe, district superintendent of New York schools, was a dead
ringer for Woodrow Wilson. Even the President's personal bodyguard was
fooled. * * * Judge S. H. King of Tulsa, Oklahoma, is the exact image of Lloyd
George to the most delicate sculpturing of his face. The Emperor Franz Josef
had his double in a Vienna hat maker who was frequently embarrassed by mis-
takenly receiving the royal salute."
' Cited in In re Wendel, 262 N. Y. Supp. 41 (1933). See also Editorial,
Proof of the Paternity of Children.by Blood Tests and Other Methods (1933)
89 N. Y. L. J. 656.
Ibid.
o In re Wendel, supra note 28.
Ibid.
22 Ibid.
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the youth of the child and the immaturity of its fea-
tures go to the weight of the evidence. * * * 33
"The New York rule is to the contrary. The rule
is based, as all rules of evidence should be, not upon
theory, but upon reason, common sense and experi-
ence. Certainly the experience of trial lawyers and
trial judges should prevail over theory and hypothe-
sis. * * *
"In paternity cases the rule of evidence in our
state prohibits the exhibition of the child to the jury
to prove resemblance to the alleged father (Bilkovic
v. Loeb, 156 App. Div. 719). * * *"
And so like Justice Holmes,34 Surrogate Foley an-
nounces his belief that experience molds the law, but the
Surrogate's experience is tainted, and he is deaf to Profes-
sor Wigmore's argument that such "testimony should be
competent, and its possible abuse should not lead to a rule
of absolute exclusion." 35 The ancients spent centuries de-
bating as to the number of angels that could dance on the
point of a needle; it is to be regretted that they had no rules
of evidence to argue about.
The Wendel 36 opinion cites the Bilkovic v. Loeb 37 case
as authority for a rule of evidence contra to the rule that
"when the paternity of a child is in issue, the child may be
exhibited to the jury to show resemblance to the putative
father, but the youth of the child and the immaturity of its
features go to the weight of evidence," 38 but a brief review
of the Bilkovic case and the cases cited therein, -will not af-
fect the decision in the Wendel case one iota.
' Cites the following cases as authorities: Scott v. Donovan, 153 Mass. 378,
26 N_ E. 871 (1891); Finnegan v. Dugan, 96 Mass. 197, 14 Allen 197(1867); Montclair v. Eason, 92 N. J. Law 199, 104 Atl. 291 (1918); Lord
Mansfield, in the Douglas case, in 2 Hargr. Collect. Jurid. 402, cited in 1 WIG-
MORE, ON EVIDENCE, at 396.
' "The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience."
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW (1881) 1.
' 1 WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE (2d ed.) 395, cited in In re Wendel, supra
note 28.
Supra note 28.
Bilkovic v. Loeb, 156 App. Div. 719, 141 N. Y. Supp. 279 (1st Dept.
1913).
' Snpra note 28.
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The Bilkovic case was an action to recover damages
for assault and rape. The Appellate Division reversed the
decision of the trial court on the grounds that the exhibi-
tion to the jury of a child alleged to have been born because
of the rape, over the objections of the defendant, was re-
versible error. At the time of the trial the child would have
been approximately two years old if the mother had con-
ceived the day of the alleged rape and had had a normal
period of gestation. The cases cited in the opinion" as
authorities for the exclusion of this exhibition of the child
were as follows:
Gray v. State, 43 Tex. Crim. Rep. 300, 65 S. W.
Rep. 375 (1901);
Barnes v. State, 37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 320, 39 S. W.
Rep. 684 (1897) ;
State v. Neel, 23 Utah 541, 65 Pac. Rep. 494
(1901) ;
State v. Danforth, 48 Iowa 43 (1878).
In the Danforth case, in addition to the complainant's
Arabian Night's story, the child sought to be exhibited was
only three months old. The opinion does, however, try to dis-
tinguish an earlier Iowa case 40 by stating that:
"In the case at bar the defendant objected to the
child being shown to the jury, and excepted to the in-
structions, and insists that the action of the court was
erroneous, not because the instruction was not clear
and distinct in language, but because the resemblance
of infants to the father is too indistinct and uncer-
tain to be allowed as evidence in a case of this char-
acter. In this view we concur. This child was about
three months old at the time of the trial. We have
found that aside from this there was no corroborat-
ing evidence to warrant a verdict of guilty, and it
would be a most unwise and dangerous rule to hold
that a man may be deprived of his liberty by reason
:' Supra note 37, at 723, N. Y. Supp. at 281.
Stumm v. Hummell, 39 Iowa 478 (1874). The age of the child was not
considered by the Court in this case, merely the erroneous charge to the jury.
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of a supposed resemblance between a child of that
age and himself." 41 (Italics ours.-Ed.)
Two years later, 1880, the same court in a somewhat
similar case, The State v. Smitlb,42 said that:
"Precisely what should be deemed the proper age
[of the child] we need not determine. It was held
in State v. Danforth, that it was error to allow a
child three months old to be exhibited. That case
is relied upon by the defendant in this. But a child
which is only three months old has that peculiar im-
maturity of features which characterizes an infant
during the time that it is called a babe. A child two
years old or more has, to a large extent, put off that
peculiar immaturity. In allowing a child of that age
to be exhibited, we think the court did not err, espe-
cially under the instruction given * * * 43
The "instruction given," refers to the charge of the
trial judge to the jury that they, the jury, must clearly see
for themselves the resemblance between child and defen-
dant.44 This charge seems to have overcome an exception
taken to the prosecutor's calling the jury's attention to the
fact that the eyes of both child and defendant were hooked
and the eyes of the mother were not.
In the Barnes v. State case,45 which was a prosecution
for seduction the Court said:
"In this case, however, no proof was made as
to the features, complexion, color of hair or eyes, etc.,
of the defendant on trial, and whatever benefit the
jury might derive from an observation of the defen-
dant is not brought into the record. We are of the
opinion that such proof, as in this case, of a child
only three or four months old, is not admissible for
"48 Iowa at 43. Cites with approval Risk v. State, 19 Kerr. 152 (Ind.
1862) and Keniston v. Rowe, 16 Me. 38, 4 Sheply 38 (Kennebec 1839).
42 State v. Smith, 54 Iowa 104 (1880).
'-'Ibid. at 105.
"Ibid. at 106.
'37 Tex. Crim. Rep. 320, 39 S. W. 684 (1897).
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the purpose of comparison in order to establish
paternity." 46 (Italics ours-Ed.)
And then, being a little doubtful, the Court hedged and
continued: 47
"Even if it were admissible., and proof had been
offered as to the complexion, features, etc., of the de-
fendant, the charge of the court was erroneous, in
calling attention to a particular part of the testimony
that could be used by the jury for no other reason
than to show paternity." (Italics ours-Ed.)
In the second and later Texas case,48 the Texas Court
remembered the reason for the decision in the Barnes case,
for the Court reiterates its decision as follows:
"The second bill of exceptions complains that the
court erred in permitting the child of the prosecutrix
to be exhibited to the jury. The district attorney,
stated he desired the exhibition of the child in order
to corroborate the prosecutrix. The exhibition of the
child could not corroborate the prosecutrix, except
upon the fact that she was the mother of the child,
if there was other proof that she was its mother. The
mere fact that the prosecutrix has brought the child
into court would not of itself establish that it was
her child. If there were extraneous proof of the fact
that this particular child was prosecutrix's, then it
would not be evidence that appellant had committed
the offeise of rape upon prosecutrix; nor would the
mere fact that prosecutrix had the child corroborate
her testimony that appellant had committed the rape.
We have heretofore held this character of testimony
could not be introduced where accused was being
tried for seduction, and the reason for holding such
testimony inadmissible in such character of cases ap-
plies with force to the case at bar. Barnes v.
State * * * 49
"
0Ibid. at 329, S. W. at 687.
"Ibid.
" 43 Te. Crim. Rep. 300, 65 S. W. 375.
'Ibid. at 301, S. W. at 375.
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The alleged rape in this case occurred "on or about
the 1st day of September, 1899"; the trial took place on
July 17, 1900.
State v. Neel,50 the fourth and last case cited in Bilkovic
v. Loeb,51 is also a case where the child of the alleged rape
is being exhibited to the jury to show resemblance between
child and defendant. In this case the child was less than a
year old when the appeal was heard. The rape was alleged
to have happened on December 14, 1898, and the decision
appealed to the Supreme Court of Utah was handed down
on June 15, 1901. In his opinion the learned judge cites
Keniston v. Rowe 52 and Risk v. State 53 among others as
authorities for his decision. Of course this digging out of
old masters can go on almost indefinitely, but we have al-
most reached the end for one court anyway.
In 1839 in the Keniston v. Rowe case,54 a bastardy ac-
tion, the Court in its opinion said that:
"It is said that the testimony offered should have
been admitted because the color of the child might
have been such as to prove conclusively, that the de-
fendant was not the father of it. But it was not the
color, or any peculiarity of conformation, or form of
features, as matters of fact, that were proposed to be
proved, it was to prove a resemblance, which is a mat-
ter of opinion; and witnesses, if they could have sight
of the persons, might be indefinitely multiplied, with-
out affording any satisfactory ground of judgment for
a jury. Witnesses, except in some art, trade or pro-
fession, requiring peculiar skill or science, are not
called to form comparisons, and to testify to opinions
arising from them.
"The facts being proved, the jury were to be the
judges of the effect of similarity or dissimilarity in
form or complexion." -5 (Italics ours-Ed.)
23 Utah 541, 65 Pac. 494 (1901).
Supra note 37.52Supra note 41.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.; 16 Me. at 40, 4 Sheply at 40.
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In 1862 in the Risk case,56 the Court in a Per Curiam
side-stepped the issue rather neatly in the following man-
ner: 57
"On the trial, the State gave the bastard child in
evidence, so that the jury might compare it with the
defendant, who was present; this was done without
objection, and the court instructed the jury that if
they discovered a resemblance between the child and
the defendant, they might regard it as a circumstance
tending to prove its paternity; tending to prove that
the defendant was its father. We doubt the right
to introduce the child in evidence. We have seen no
authority on the joint. It would be an uncertain
rule of evidence. It would involve the necessity of
giving the alleged father in evidence. A child changes
often and much in looks, in the first three months of
its existence. But, in this case, as the evidence went
in without objection, the jury had a right to consider
it." (Italics ours-Ed.)
Recapitulating, the Bilkovic case disregards one Iowa case
practically on "all-fours" with its own facts, to cite an
earlier Iowa case, but the decision in which was more com-
patible to the Appellate Division's idea of what the law
should be. The facts in the other cases cited in the Bilkovic
case would logically lead to the decisions handed down by
those respective courts, but for the Appellate Division to
flat-footedly pronounce a rule of evidence on the ground of
stare decisis, and at the same time to ignore the reasons for
the decisions abided by, is unfortunate. Whether the Court
of Appeals would reverse the Appellate Division and follow
the so-called more logical rule, to wit, that in those cases
where the child to be exhibited to the jury has matured to
such an extent that its features have assumed a definite
and distinct contour, such exhibition is proper, is a matter
of speculation.
The review of the authorities cited in the Biltkovic case
have revealed one important fact, however, and that is, that
' Supra note 41.
"Ibid. 19 Kerr (Ind.) at 153.
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Keniston v. Rowe is the apparent fountainhead of authority
for cases of this nature in the United States. What is more
important is the dictum in the opinion to the effect that:
"But it was not the color, or any peculiarity of
conformation, or form of features, as matters of fact
that were proposed to be proved, it was to prove a
resemblance, which is a matter of opinion * *
The court by its statement infers that it would allow
evidence of color, peculiarity of conformation, or form of
features, and yet less than a hundred years later that same
court's decision and cases based upon it are being cited as
authorities by New York courts for just the opposite rule.
Professor Wigmore in his exhaustive work on Evidence
summarizes the subject of resemblance as evidence of pa-
ternity, as follows: 58
"The English practice seems always to have ad-
mitted this evidence without question. In the United
States the early practice was probably the same; but
as the chief use of the evidence was found in filiation
proceedings to charge the defendant with the pater-
nity of a bastard, the possible abuses of the evidence
led to an unfortunate questioning of its validity under
any circumstances * * + "
"Some courts in the United States now exclude
this kind of evidence, partly through misunderstand-
ing the precedents in its favor, partly for the reasons
above quoted (Professor Wigmore here reviews and
compares all the important cases decided in the vari-
ous states in the Union-Ed.). Moreover, by a curi-
ous contrariety of views, in some instances, the evi-
dentiary fact of resemblance is excluded only when
offered through testimony of those who have seen the
child; in other instances, only when offered by the
presentation of the child in court. The partial ex-
clusion of the former mode of evidence is based chiefly
on the Opinion rule-the fallacy of which, in this ap-
plication, needs no further exposition; and partly
1 WIGMORE, ON EVIDENCE 397.
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also on the ease with which a resemblance can be
affirmed in general terms, but the simple correction
for this danger is to require detailed statements of
specific traits, for the force of the inference rests on
these and not on a general resemblance. The partial
exclusion of the other mode of evidence-presentation
of the child in court-rests on no good reason what-
ever * * * . The sound rule is to admit the fact of
similarity of specific traits however presented, pro-
vided the child is in the opinion of the trial court old
enough to possess settled features or other corporal
indications."
So we find that one of the greatest authorities on evi-
dence recommending the admission in evidence of specific
traits, which science claims it has proven hereditary.
In an early Arkansas case,59 where the plantiffs were
suing for freedom, the plaintiffs in corroboration of their
claim that they belonged to the white race were permitted
to take off their shoes and stockings, and exhibit their bare
feet for the observation of the jury, because, as the Court
states: 60
"Physicians, whose testimony was introduced,
and who professed to be acquainted with physiology,
and the distinguishing features of the races, state that
the color, hair, feet, nose and form of the skull and
bones, furnish means of distinguishing negro blood
or descent.
"The experience of every intelligent observer of
the race, whether in the instances of mixed or un-
mixed negro blood, will doubtless attest the truth of
the professional witnesses. No one who is familiar
with the peculiar formation of the negro foot, can
doubt that an inspection of that member would ordi-
narily afford some indication of the race-though the
evidence of race, thus afforded, would, of course, be
stronger or weaker, according to the extent of the ad-
mixture of the blood."
'Daniel v. Guy, et aL., 23 Barb. 50 (Ark. 1861).
0 Ibid. at 52.
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In another case involving the determination of the race
of the person before the court, the United States Supreme
Court overruled the exclusion of evidence by the trial court,
and in its opinion stated that: 61
"All the testimony of the government identifying
Hung Chang as a Chinese person was excluded. * * *
To identify such Chinese persons in the first instance,
inspectors and interpreters are employed. The wit-
nesses offered were two inspectors and one inter-
preter. These witnesses had devoted and were de-
voting their time to the identification and examina-
tion of Chinese persons. They had made a practical
study of the characteristics of Chinamen. They were
prepared to testify that Hung Chang was a Chinese
person; but the court would not permit it, because
they did not qualify as experts in the sciences of an-
thropology and ethomology. * ** The court assumed
there are certain racial characteristics concealed
somewhere about Chinamen, which can only be shown
by great study in books, and that the identification
of a person as a Chinaman upon any other grounds
of distinction is worthless evidence.
"* * * Upon the question of race ancestry, the
persons involved is after the best evidence to produce.
It is a case of 'res ipsa loquitur.' * * *1
In Garvin v. The State, 52 Miss. 207, it was held that,
where an indictment described the accused as a "colored
person" that fact might be proven by his production before
the jury; the Court saying (p. 209) :
"It is urged that this was erroneous, because it
is-said that the jury can know nothing except by the
testimony of witnesses. This is not true as to physi-
cal facts, which may be brought to their attention by
ocular demonstration. It would not be necessary to
prove by other testimony than profert of the party
that he was a 'person,' 'a man' if so described in the
'United States v. Hung Chang, 134 Fed. 19, 25, 26 (1905).
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indictment. See also Warlick v. White, 76 N. 0. 175,
179 * *
In an Illinois case 62 in addition to proof of race the
prosecutrix introduced:
"* * * the testimony of a physician that the child
of the prosecutrix had a rudimentary or supernumer-
ary finger proceeding from the middle or second joint
of each little finger, 'with a beginning nail.' He fur-
ther testified that in his opinion supernumerary fin-
gers 'are usually an 'hereditary trait.' He stated,
also, that his opinion was based entirely upon books
that he had read, and was unable to give the names
of any books that he had read on the subject. * * *
The only authorities relied on by plaintiff in error
to sustain his position that the foregoing evidence is
inadmissible are those holding that it is not permis-
sible to introduce evidence of family resemblance be-
tween a child and the putative father to prove the
paternity of the child. It is perhaps true that the
weight of authority in this country is against the ad-
mission of parole evidence to prove the resemblance
of the child to the putative father, and that evidence
of family resemblance, by a view by the jury and a
comparison of the child with the putative father, is
inadmissible for the same purpose if the child has
not attained an age when its features have assumed
some degree of maturity and permanency. The au-
thorities are in very great conflict as to whether or
not such view and comparison may be had of a child
for such purpose when its features have assumed, in
the judgment of the court, that degree of maturity
and permanency that the resemblance or lack of it
may be expected to continue. By the weight of au-
thority, the rule is well established that the child at
any age, may be exhibited to the jury for the purpose
of proving its race, when that question is a material
one in the case. * * *
The People v. Kingcannon, 276 Irwin 251, 257, 258, 114 N. E. 508, 511
(Ill. 1916).
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"Supernumerary fingers and toes, or polydactyl-
ism, are usually considered by law writers under the
general head of malformations, and are regarded by
well recognized authorities as being hereditary and
frequently caused by consanguinous marriages. * * *
The testimony of the physician in this case that super-
numerary fingers are usually hereditary stands un-
contradicted in the record, and we think the evidence
was admissible. The child was not exhibited in evi-
dence. The testmony that it had supernumerary fin-
gers was the mere statement of a fact, and it was
proper to so prove it without the exhibition of the
child * * * where the proof shows, or tends to show,
that the putative father had, or had had, supernumer-
ary fingers and that the child also had them, we think
such evidence is competent as tending to show the
paternity of the child, when accompanied by the fur-
ther evidence that supernumerary fingers are usually
hereditary and by the positive testimony of the prose-
cutrix that he is the father of the child. Such evi-
dence ought to be regarded as a mere circumstance
that might be of value in deciding a doubtful case.
In Beck's Medical Jurisprudence, in speaking of this
character of evidence, the author makes use of the
following words: 'It has been suggested that the re-
semblance of a child to the supposed father might aid
in deciding doubtful cases. This, however, is a very
uncertain source of reliance. We daily observe the
most striking differences in physical traits between
parent and child, while individuals born in different
parts of the globe have been mistaken for each other.
And even as to malformations, although some re-
markable resemblances in this respect have been noted
between father and child; yet we should act unwisely
in relying too much on them.'
"It is further suggested by plaintiff in error's
counsel that the evidence in this case is overwhelm-
ing that plaintiff in error had no such fingers. This
is merely a question for the jury when properly pre-
sented to them without errors in the record. In this
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opinion we are not passing upon the weight of the
evidence but merely as to its admissibility."
A lengthy quotation, to be sure, but the clearness of the
court's distinction between the types of evidence of this na-
ture which are admissible and not admissible is worthy of
repetition. It is particularly noticeable that the court ad-
mits the evidence for two reasons, (1) because it is the only
available evidence in doubtful cases, and (2) science claims
it has proven that a trait such as the one in question is
hereditary.63
In Gilmanton v. Harn ( 4 the court permitted the com-
plexion, appearance and features to be observed by the jury
for any assistance the jury could obtain from such observa-
tion. Whereas, in People v. Carney 61 the admission in evi-
dence of the color of the child's eyes was held to be reversible
error. In Petrie v. Howe,66 which is cited as authority in
See also Finnegan v. Dugan, supra note 33, where the Court says: "The
fact of a resemblance between the child and the putative father was proper for
the consideration of the jury. It is a well-known physiological fact that pecu-
liarities of feature and personal traits are often transmitted from parent to
child. Taken by itself, proof of such resemblance would be insufficient to
establish the paternity; but it would be clearly a circumstance to be considered
in connection with other facts tending to prove the issue on which the jury are
to pass."
'38 N. H. 108 (1859).
29 Hun (N. Y.) 49 (4th, 1883).
14 Thomp. & Cook 85 (N. Y. 1874). The plaintiff husband as a witness
for himself had testified that he had had four children by his wife, giving their
names and ages, and then that another child was born of his wife.
"He then gave evidence, by other witnesses, tending to establish a
criminal intimacy between the defendant and his wife in and through the
summer and fall of 1870; and then he was recalled and examined by his
counsel further as a witness, when the questions and answers and proceed-
ings following occurred.
"Q. Mr. Petrie, I desire to ask you whether this lady here is your
wife."
"A. Yes, sir."
"Q. The child, her child?"
"A. Yes, sir."
"Q. Will you state the color of the hair of your four children?"
"The defendant's counsel of course objected, but the objection was
overruled and the evidence was admitted and excepted to. The case was
appealed to the Supreme Court and the Court, reversing the trial.Court
and sending the case back for a new trial, insisted that:
"Proof of the color of the plaintiff's four other children, of itself,
was clearly immaterial. * * * The object was quite apparent, to suggest
and induce a comparison by the jury between the plaintiff's other children
and the one then exhibited, upon view of the child and the plaintiff and
his wife and of the defendant. * * *
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the Carney case, the court held that evidence of the color
of the child's hair was error. In the case of People V. Djon 67
the court permitted as evidence in rebuttal, testimony as to
the color of the hair and eyes of the child and its mother,
because it was given in answer to testimony on the same
subject, which was first given by the defendant and one of
his witnesses. And so the courts in the various states dis-
agree as to the value and authenticity of evidence of this
nature.
In respect to the use of blood tests as proof of paternity,
the writer has been unable to find any reported case in the
"If this species of physiological evidence is admissible in a court ofjustice it should not be covertly given, and in a shape not subject to the
usual tests and exceptions applied to other evidence." (Italics ours.-Ed.)
Notice that the Court objects to the introduction of this evidence only
because of the manner in which it was introduced.
The following year, 1875, the Court of Appeals was confronted with the
question of whether or not the color of hair was admissible in evidence. In this
case, Lindsay v. People (63 N. Y. 143), however, the evidence was held to be
admissible because:
"Evidence of the color of hair and whiskers of the deceased, the
measure of the body found, and the stature of the deceased, * * * all
tended to identify the body found as that of Colvin, alleged to have been
murdered." (Italics ours.-Ed.)
In this case the state also introduced evidence of blood stains found at the
alleged site of the crime, and as to the admissibility of blood stains as evidence
the Court of Appeals stated that:
"Proof of finding blood on different timbers and boards of the barn
after the discovery of the body in June, six months after the alleged
murder, was competent and it tended to corroborate Vader as to the
manner in which, and the course by which, the body was taken from the
place of killing to the hay loft. So far as the lapse of time detracted
from the force of the evidence it was for the consideration of the jury."
The blood stains found, must, of course, have been proven to be Human
blood stains or else their value to the prosecution would have been nil, and
evidently that was what actually happened, for the Court in its opinion recites
that:
"The questions of fact, viz., the identity of the board that the blood
spots were on them from the night of the nineteenth of December, had to
be found by the jury before effect could be given to the evidence of the
expert. It is enough that there was evidence tending to prove these facts.
There was no evidence that the boards were in any different condition or
differently stained than when they left the possession of the defendant
and as they were the day after the murder, except that hogs had been
dressed upon them within a day or two after the alleged murder, and
there was evidence, upon which the prosecution relied, that the blood of
men and of hogs was distinguishable and that both were upon these
boards." (Italics ours.-Ed.)
The expert's testimony as to the origin of these blood stains helped to
corroborate the other evidence of the state, and as such was properly admissible.
183 Hun (N. Y.) 305 (5th, 1894).
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United States where the results of blood tests were admit-
ted into evidence by the court. There has been much pub-
licity about plaintiffs demanding blood tests, 68 but nothing
has happened as yet.
In Europe and elsewhere in the world, however, the
claims of science are more appreciated. In the Latin coun-
tries of Europe, France, Italy and Spain, the spirit and the
letter of the Code Napoleon are still dominant, and the old
maxim still holds: pater semper incertus. Except for very
extraordinary cases, the law does not recognize the scien-
tific value of biological proof of parenthood; in fact it is
seldom resorted to.
Lattes 69 claims that "a few cases were investigated by
Goldstein in Trieste, when the Austro-Hungarian Civil Law
was in force, and a few others in the old provinces, which
have given rise to interesting judgments by the Higher
Courts." The Supreme Italian Court of Cassation (Febru-
ary 13, 1931) had this to say: 70
"As regards the reliability of the results obtained
by this method, the latest studies and investigations
show that though the determination of the blood
groups affords no positive evidence for a declaration
of affiliation in a given case, it does on the other hand
furnish incontrovertible evidence for the eoclusion of
this relationship when the child's blood group does
not agree, according to a definite scheme, with that
of the supposed father."
In Belgium the Correctional Court in December, 1930,
declared guilty a defendant who was accused of being the
father of a child by a girl less than 16 years old, because
the blood tests did not exclude the alleged paternity.71
The Commissar for Soviet Justice, who in 1926 had pro-
hibited the use of blood tests in paternity suits, as not af-
fording sufficiently positive proof, altered in his views in
c'See New York World-Telegram, March 15. 1933, p. 1. See also Editorial
in N. Y. L. J., supra note 28.
' Supra note 22, at 248.
70 Ibid. at 254.
1 Ibid. at 250.
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1927 and allowed these tests, regarding them as furnishing
absolutely conclusive evidence:72
In Germany the Code allows the question: "Is it clearly
impossible (offenbar unmdglich) for the defendant to be
held the father of this child?" 73 The Landegericht II, Ber-
lin, in April, 1927, was convinced that: 71
"Paternity cannot be allowed in this case, for ex-
pert evidence shows it to be 'clearly impossible' for
the plaintiff to have been conceived during the co-
habitation of the mother with the defendant. The
plaintiff belongs to group B, a property which is
found neither in his mother's blood nor in that of the
defendant. The evidence of the experts, which is
based on numerous investigations carried out in all
civilized countries, and is now no longer questioned
by competent scientists, and is moreover directed to
be used in evidence by the superior judicial authori-
ties (e.g., the Minister of Justice for Wiirttemberg)
shows that the real father must belong to Group B
to have transmitted this property to his son. The
defendant cannot, therefore, be the father of the
plaintiff."
This decision was affirmed on April 4, 1930, by the Prus-
sian Kammersgericht, Section 8. On September 22, 1930,
the Reichsgericht (German Supreme Court) dismissed an
appeal based on the unreliability of blood tests for exclu-
sion of paternity.75
Lattes also claims that in 1929 there were five thousand
cases in Germany and one thousand five hundred cases in
Austria decided on the basis of blood tests as proof of pa-
ternity.76 At the 1926 meeting of the German Medico-Legal
Society, it was reported that such proof has been allowed in
the courts of: Russia (35 cases) ; Norway (11 cases) ; Swe-
den (165 cases); Denmark (550 cases); and in Netherlands,
Brazil and Japan.7 7
7.Ibid. at 252.
Ibid. at 251.
7, Ibid. at 253.
Ibid. at 254.
"Ibid. at 255.
'Ibid.
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CONCLUSIONS.
It should be noticed that the writer has tried to refrain
from commenting upon either the scientific or legal data
collated in the preceding pages. The data are there, vari-
ous conclusions can be obtained from a close analysis. The
writer's conclusion is that the New York courts, at least,
have refused to fall into the error that the European courts
'have, and that is, to anticipate scientific facts.
In 1927 the Landegericht II was convinced of the in-
fallibility of the blood test to prove the impossibility of pa-
ternity,78 yet in the following year the two scientists who
had performed most of the research work, and one of whom
later was awarded the Nobel Prize for this research, frankly
admitted that more studies must be made before the test in
question could be used as a matter of routine. 9 We find
the English courts and the courts of certain states in this
country allowing evidence of resemblance of infants and
adults to an alleged father, yet it is common knowledge that
the features of infants undergo remarkable changes before
maturity is attained, and the common phenomena of
"doubles" and resemblances is being constantly discussed in
newspapers, novels, and plays. The numerous convictions
of persons erroneously identified as someone else because of
a fancied or actual resemblance has already perturbed the
scholars of the legal profession;80 when experience has
proved that witnesses even fail to identify and recognize
the features of one person, how unreasonable it is to assume
that witnesses or jurors can actually recognize a resemblance
between two persons, particularly when the features of one
are indistinct and unformed. The various courts in this
country have held that testimony by a medical expert rela-
tive to the following matters were admissible: effect of ex-
ternal pressure on lungs ;"' sensation of pain as though limb
remained after amputation ;81 probable effect of injury;83
Supra note 74.
SuPra note 25a .
See BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (Yale Univ. Press, 1932).
Tompkins v. West, 56 Conn. 478, 16 Atl. 237 (1888).
SHickenbottam v. Delaware, etc. Ry. Co., 122 N. Y. 91, 24 N. E. 279(1890).
Stembridge v. Southern Railway Co., 65 S. C. 440, 43 S. R. 968 (1902).
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boy capable of begetting child ;84 probable effect of being un-
able to breathe through the nose ;s5 blood stains are human
blood stains;86 supernumerary fingers are "usually an
hereditary trait" ;87 whether child was in "full development"
at birth ;88 analysis of pus examined under a microscope ;89
whether a hair is a human hair;90 actual penetration at
time of rape;91 sex of a person from an examination of the
skeleton 92 and so on.
But it has been held that a medical expert cannot testify
to the following matters: whether sexual intercourse against
a woman's consent was possible; 91 as to the reactions ob-
tained by the systolic blood-pressure deception test; 94 and
whether a person could live after being struck by a locomo-
tive.95 In other words, the medical expert may testify as to
what appears to him to be the cause of certain symptoms
under the ascertained facts, and which of these ascertained
facts was the probable or proximate cause, but the expert
cannot testify as to whether the ascertained fact or facts
could or could not cause a given result, or, in a certain case
did so. Furthermore, if the expert's testimony is contrary
to reason or opposed to natural and physical laws, such testi-
mony will be excluded; 96 testimony will also be excluded
where the court in its discretion is unconvinced by the claim
that the testimony is founded upon an infallible scientific
fact.9 7
'Johnson v. Castle, 63 Vt. 452, 21 Atl. 534 (1891).
Morgenstein v. Nejedlo, 79 Wis. 388, 48 N. W. 652 (1891).
- Supra note 67. See also Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass. 122(1875); State v. Knight, 43 Me. 1 (1857); Knoll v. State, 55 Wis. 249,
12 N. W. 369 (1882).
Supra note 62.
s' Souchek v. Karr, 78 Neb. 488, 111 N. W. 150 (1907).
"United States Health etc. Co. v. Jolly, - Ky. -, 118 S. W. 281 (1909).
' Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 103 Mass. 412 (1870); see also R6GERS,
EXPERT TESTIMONY (2d ed., Central Law Journal Co., 1891) 146.
State v. Smith, Phillips Law, 302, 61 N. C. 302 (N. C. 1867).
'Wilson v. State, 41 Tex. 320 (1874).
' State v. Peterson, 110 Iowa 647, 82 N. W. 329 (1900) ; Lawlor v. Wolff,
180 Mass. 448, 62 N. E. 973 (1902).
' Frye v. United States, 293 Fed. 1013 (D. C. 1923).
Chicago & A. R. Co. v. Lewondowski, 190 Ill. 301, 60 N. E. 497 (1901).
"Higgins v. Mason, 226 App. Div. 426, 235 N. Y. Supp. 441 (1929);
Szpyrka v. Inter. Rwy. Co., 213 App. Div. 390, 210 N. Y. Supp. 553 (1925) ;
Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Co. v. O'Neill, 186 Fed. 13 (C. C. A. 6th, 1911).
' Supra note 94.
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By way of an illustration, let us assume that in a certain
large city there is a rule that -foundling infants can be
adopted only by Christian couples, unless it can be proved
that the parents of the foundling were co-religionists of the
couple seeking to adopt the foundling, when the couple seek-
ing to adopt the infant are not Christians. Let us further
assume that the foundling is about one year of age, that there
is a bright cherry-red spot occupying the place of the macula
lutea, in a milky blue or white area. Medical science will
claim that if there is no evidence of vascular disease, that the
overwhelming probability is that the infant is idiopathic for
amaurotic family idiocy. In the event that a Jewish couple
seek to adopt this infant, is science also prepared to substan-
tiate their claim that amaurotic family idiocy is only heredi-
tary in Jewish people? 98 The legal profession needs every
possible aid that science can furnish, but science must first
make certain that its claims are irrefutable.
As previously indicated, the European courts have ac-
cepted as infallible the blood test which indicates the impos-
sibility of paternity. Members of the legal profession in this
state are attempting to use the decisions of the European
courts as a reason why the New York courts should recognize
such blood tests.99 Surely, when as eminent a scientist as
Dr. Alec Hrdlicka, Anthropologist of the United States Na-
tional Museum, emphatically states that such blood tests
cannot as yet be regarded as anything but experimental, and
that no definite conclusions can be based on such tests,100
together with the premature decisions of the European
courts, as a matter of law,101 the courts of the State of New
York will be justified in refusing to allow testimony relative
to such blood tests.
There undoubtedly is much to be said for the scientific
claims that certain easily recognized abnormalities are heredi-
tary, as stated in the preceding pages, and undoubtedly the
Salaman, Heredity and the Jew (1911) 1 JouR. GENETICS 273.
' See New York World-Telegram, March 15, 1933, p. 1, where the plain-
tiff's attorney is reported to have said: "* * * there was no reason why the
courts here should not accept blood tests in paternity cases, as the courts of
Europe did."
"' As stated in a letter dated January 27, 1933, from Mr. Frederick M.
Kerby, Director Washington Information Bureau, to the writer.
'Supra note 94.
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legal profession would do well to familiarize itself with those
same scientific claims. At the present time paternity cases
are difficult to prove because of the almost absolute lack of
conclusive, or even corroborative evidence, but, at best, sci-
ence's present claims are merely inferences, and the law does
not permit an inference to be drawn from inference.
It is argued, that even if science is not as yet prepared
to unqualifiedly claim that certain physical traits are inevi-
tably .inherited in an ascertained manner, that nevertheless
the opinions of medical experts relative to the possibilities
of such physical traits having been inherited should be admit-
ted in evidence in order to corroborate other evidence; that
the jury should be allowed to consider such opinion evidence
for what the jury may think it to be worth. Justice Holmes
emphasized the fact that the life of the law is experience.
Experience has proved that even the learned judges of the
highest courts in other countries have been mistaken as to the
facts of science; it is more than likely then that the ordinary
juror, untrained in science and unaccustomed to analyzing
the statements of biased experts, would also rely too much on
the claims of scientific experimenters.
The law cannot control the thinking processes of jurors,
but the law can, and should, prevent the introduction of
testimony which would erroneously prejudice jurors.
HARRY F. J. SCHROEDER.
St. John's College School of Law.
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